Peirce’s idea of an unlimited community has been usually analyzed from its role in science and the normative ideal of truth. However, it is essential to understand the role of the community of inquiry in light of the other normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics, since according to Peirce, any endeavor to know that is not guided by the esthetical ideal of admirable per se should not be considered as proper science, but as a power tool to benefit some elite. This (...) article aims to analyze Peirce’s idea of community of inquiry in light of sentimentalism and the normative sciences in order to evidence that such community is not elitist, but open, insofar as it is also lured by the summum bonum and the admirable per se. Finally, we provide a more organic reading of Peirce’s work, opening the way to consider possible consequences of this position from an ethical and political perspective. (shrink)

The process of assessing executive functions through behavioral observation scales is still under theoretical and empirical construction. This article reports on the analysis of the factorial structure of the EOCL-1 scale that assesses executive functions, as proposed by the theory developed by Luria, which has not been previously considered in this type of evaluation. In this scale, the executive functions taken into account are error correction, internal behavioral and cognition regulatory language, limbic system conscious regulation, decision making, future consideration of (...) consequences of actions, goal-directed behavior, inhibitory control of automatic responses, creation of new behavioral repertoires, and cognitive–behavioral activity verification. A variety of validity and reliability analyses were carried out, with the following results: an adequate internal consistency level of executive functions between α = 0.70 and α = 0.83, significant convergent validity with a scale that assesses frontal deficits between r = −0.07 and r = 0.28, and the scale’s construct validity that proposes a model with an executive central factor comparative fit index = 0.93, root mean square error of approximation = 0.04, standardized root mean square residual = 0.04, and x2 = 789.29, p = 0.001. The findings are discussed based on previous literature reports and in terms of the benefits of using a scale to assess the proposed executive functions. (shrink)

The use of technologies like artificial intelligence can drive productivity growth, efficiency and innovation. The goal of this study is to develop an anomaly detection method for locating flaws on the surface of sandwich panels using YOLOv5. The proposed algorithm extracts information locally from an image through a prediction system that creates bounding boxes and determines whether the sandwich panel surface contains flaws. It attempts to reject or accept a product based on quality levels specified in the standard. To evaluate (...) the proposed method, a comparison was made with a sandwich panel damage detection method based on a convolutional neural network and methods based on thresholding. The findings show that the proposed method, which is based on an object detector, is more accurate than the alternatives. The characteristics of the model, which can reject or accept a product according to the standard and limit allowable manufacturing flaws to obtain a quality product, also enable this system to improve industrial standards for producing sandwich panels while increasing speed. (shrink)

RESUMEN Cuando se mira la masacre de El Salado, es difícil no preguntarse por los factores que llevaron a esta comunidad de los Montes de María, en el contexto de la guerra rural que vivía Colombia a finales del siglo XX, a volverse un objetivo militar por parte de las A.U.C. (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), es decir, a recibir la marca o estigma de 'pueblo guerrillero'; en otras palabras, a convertirse en un pueblo masacrable. El presente artículo intenta abordar esta (...) cuestión y para ello analiza las consecuencias de la ocupación de las FARC desde su ingreso a la región en los noventa. Los modos como este poder fareano dispuso de lógicas guerreristas y dejó poco margen de maniobra y libertad para los pobladores de El Salado; los saladeros no tuvieron opción ni libertad, y la cohabitación se confundió con la colaboración, la pasividad con la pertenencia. En una segunda parte, revisa los efectos de la arremetida brutal de las FARC contra cierto grupo de pobladores (en especial, ganaderos y fuerza pública); de algún modo, la masacre del 2000, ejecutada por las AUC, fue una respuesta impulsada por un odio desmedido frente a una violencia también excesiva por parte de las FARC en los años anteriores a la masacre. En este apartado, se habla acerca del odio y la venganza que se constituyen en afectos que contribuyeron decisivamente -entre otros más- a la masacre del año 2000. Las elaboraciones sobre la economía del odio de Sara Ahmed (2015) y las de Laura Quintana sobre los afectos (2020 y 2021) serán fundamentales. ABSTRACT When looking at the El Salado massacre, we wonder about the factors that led this town of los Montes de María, in the context of the rural war in Colombia at the end of the 20th century, to become a military objective by the A.U.C (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), that is, to receive the brand or stigma of 'guerrilla people'; that is, to become a massacrable town. This article tries to address this issue, thus analyzing the consequences of the FARC occupation since its entry into the region in the nineties. Ways like this Farean power had warmer logic and left little room for maneuver and freedom for the residents of El Salado; The saladeros had no choice or freedom, and cohabitation was confused with collaboration, passivity with belonging. in a second part, it reviews the effects of the brutal attack by the FARC against a certain group of residents (especially, ranchers and the military); in a way, the 2000 massacre, carried out by the AUC, was an inordinately hateful response to excessive violence by the FARC in the years before the massacre. In this section, we talk about the hatred and revenge that constitute elements that contributed decisively -among others- to the 2000 massacre. The elaborations on the economy of hate by Sara Ahmed (2015) and the elaborations of Laura Quintana on affects (2020 and 2021) will be fundamental. (shrink)

Literature on attitude similarity suggests that sharing similar attitudes enhances interpersonal liking, but it remains unanswered whether this effect also holds for ambivalent attitudes. In the present research, we shed light on the role attitudinal ambivalence plays in interpersonal liking. Specifically, we examine whether people express ambivalence strategically to generate a positive or negative social image, and whether this is dependent on the attitudinal ambivalence of their perceiver. We test two alternative hypotheses. In line with the attitude-similarity effect, people should (...) express ambivalence towards ambivalent others to enhance interpersonal liking, as sharing ambivalence might socially validate the latter’s experience of attitudinal conflict. On the other hand, people might express more univalence, as ambivalence may drive ambivalent others towards the resolution of their attitudinal conflict and univalent stances could help to achieve that goal. In two studies (N = 449, 149), people expressed similar attitudes to those of their perceivers, even when the latter experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1 and 2). Moreover, they composed an essay, the message of which validated their perceiver’s attitudinal conflict (Study 2). In line with these results, we further observe that the more people experienced their ambivalence as conflicting, the more they liked others who similarly experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1). These findings suggest that the expression of ambivalence can have important interpersonal functions, as it might lead to an enhanced social image when interacting with those coping with attitudinal conflict. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones (...) can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

Este trabalho busca analisar os desdobramentos da relação entre infâncias, juventudes e sexualidades que se apresentam nas escolas em tempos de cerceamentos e perseguições presentes na última década à escola. Falar de infância é discorrer sobre corpos e, justamente por isso, é indissociável da sexualidade. As relações interpessoais que ocorrem nos espaços escolares são imprescindíveis para socializações com vidas outras. No entanto, após a censura da temática de gênero e sexualidades nos planos educacionais recentes, bem como na Base Nacional Comum (...) Curricular, e frente às sistemáticas perseguições aos professores interessados em sua discussão, nosso intuito é indagar o lugar do corpo e da sexualidade na escola, sobretudo em tempos de neoconservadorismo e pós-fascismo. Enquanto definição, entendemos por neoconservadorismo os novos agenciamentos que a matiz conservadora se utilizou para a sua consolidação na população brasileira; e, por pós-fascismo, as novas esferas de sociabilidades a partir de pragmatismos à identificação de valores comum na sociedade na promoção do pânico moral. Para sustentarmos nossa análise, utilizaremos três cenas escolares de educação para a sexualidade, entendidas aqui como práticas de resistências. Estas, muito embora recentemente vistas na sociedade como responsáveis pela destruição da família tradicional brasileira (de base heteronormativa), são valorizadas para a promoção de infâncias seguras. (shrink)

The feminine mystique confines women to the golden cage of the home, where the female body is locked in inactivity, in placidity at least. Against an institutionalized form of love, the mystics of the spiritual realm choose a ‘wild’ love, a love without rules, without conditions, a love that goes beyond the material to become pure adhesion, pure proximity, pure fusion and confusion. It is a strange form of love in that it consists only of reciprocity of subjects, a strange (...) love that feeds on passion and intensity. It is a love that exists outside the quotidian, one that never gets tired or grows old. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware. Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be. Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves (...) that grounds our responsibility. I argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused. It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent. But we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, self-directed action. There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible. I replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question. This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness—which, I argue, we must abandon in any case. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest (...) that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response. (shrink)

This third edition of the bestselling An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist Perspectives confirms the ongoing centrality of feminist perspectives and research to the sociological enterprise and introduces students to the wide range of feminist contributions to key areas of sociological concern. This completely revised edition includes: · new chapters on sexuality and the media · additional material on race and ethnicity, disability and the body · many new international and comparative examples · the influence of theories of globalization and post-colonial (...) studies. The theoretical elements have also been fully rethought in light of recent developments in social theory. Written by three experienced academics, this book gives students of sociology and women's studies an accessible overview of the feminist contribution to all the key areas of sociological concern. (shrink)

¿Cómo objetivar la subjetividad sin caer en subjetivismos inmanentistas ni en objetivismos ajenos a la existencia personal? Desde el realismo filosófico la clave parece encontrarse en la adecuada articulación entre conciencia y subjetividad. Estudiaremos las teorías de la conciencia de Antonio Millán-Puelles y Karol Wojtyła desde la onto-fenomenología para hallar el modo de superar esta aporía. -/- How to objectify subjectivity without falling into either immanent subjectivisms or objectivisms foreign to personal existence? From the perspective of realist philosophy the key (...) seems to be found in an appropriate articulation between consciousness and subjectivity. We are going to study the theories of consciousness in Antonio Millán-Puelles and Karol Wojtyła from onto-phenomenology in order to find the way to overcome this aporia. (shrink)

The popularity and profitability of American gridiron football is beyond dispute. Recent polls put football as the overwhelming favorite of people who follow at least one sport and huge revenues are reported at both the professional and the university level. We know, however, that what is the case tells us little about what ought to be the case, and it is to the latter question that this paper is directed. I offer a three-pronged attack on the ethical acceptability of American (...) football, both amateur and professional, based on harm to the players, objectification of the players, and harm to others done by the players, leading to the conclusion that the sport, as currently constituted, is morally unacceptable. (shrink)

Adults who are incapacitated and alone, having no surrogates, may be known as “unbefriended.” Decision-making for these particularly vulnerable patients is a common and vexing concern for healthcare providers and hospital ethics committees. When all other avenues for resolving the need for surrogate decision-making fail, patients who are incapacitated and alone may be referred for “public guardianship” or guardianship of last resort. While an appropriate mechanism in theory, these programs are often under-staffed and under-funded, laying the consequences of inadequacies on (...) the healthcare system and the patient him or herself. We describe a qualitative study of professionals spanning clinical, court, and agency settings about the mechanisms for resolving surrogate consent for these patients and problems therein within the state of Massachusetts. Interviews found that all participants encountered adults who are incapacitated and without surrogates. Four approaches for addressing surrogate needs were: work to restore capacity; find previously unknown surrogates; work with agencies to obtain surrogates; and access the guardianship system. The use of guardianship was associated with procedural challenges and ethical concerns including delays in care, short term gains for long term costs, inabilities to meet a patient’s values and preferences, conflicts of interest, and ethical discomfort among interviewees. Findings are discussed in the context of resources to restore capacity, identify previously unknown surrogates, and establish improved surrogate mechanisms for this vulnerable population. (shrink)

An important milestone of 20th Century philosophy was the rise of personalism. After the crimes and atrocities against millions of human beings in two World Wars, especially the Second, some philosophers and other thinkers began to seek arguments showing the value of each human being, to expose and denounce the folly of political structures that violate the inalienable rights of the individual person. -/- Karol Wojtyla appeals to the ancient concept of 'person' to emphasize the particular value of each human (...) being. The person is unique because of their subjectivity by which they possesses an unrepeatable interior world in the history of humanity. Their rational nature grants them a special character among living beings, among which is the transcendence to the infinite. Wojtyla magisterially shows how each human being's personhood is rooted in a conscious and free subjectivity, which is marked also by personal and social responsibility. Wojtyla's original philosophical analysis takes for its starting point the human act, in which consciousness and experience consolidate voluntary choices, which are objectively efficacious. By their acts, the person determines their own personhood. This self-dominion manifests the person and enables them to live together in a community in which one's neighbor can be a companion on the voyage of life. -/- This work provides a clear guide to Karol Wojtyla's principal philosophical work, Person and Act, rigorously analyzing the meaning that the author intended in his exposition. An important feature of the work is that the authors rely on the original Polish text, Osoba i czyn, as well as the best translations into Italian and Spanish, rather than on a flawed and sometimes misleading English edition of the work. -/- Besides the analysis of Wojtyla's masterwork, this volume offers three chapters examining the impact of Wojtyla's anthropology on the relationship between faith and reason. (shrink)

La Neuroteología surge como una nueva forma de explicar las relaciones entre el ser humano y Dios, las religiones y la espiritualidad en general a partir de la neurología (estudio del sistema nervioso, especialmente del encéfalo). Pero en algunos casos pretende incluso demostrar la existencia o no existencia de Dios. En este trabajo deseo exponer de qué manera algunas formas de Neuroteología manifiestan un rasgo sintomático de la cultura actual donde la ciencia actúa como un saber omnímodo que aspira explicar (...) todos los aspectos de la realidad pasando por alto sus propios límites metodológicos. Algunos investigadores transgreden los principios del método científico-experimental para extrapolarlos a cuestiones filosóficas y teológicas. De esta forma violentan las fronteras epistemológicas de los saberes para convertirse en un único tipo de conocimiento. La ciencia lleva a cabo, cuando menos, un reduccionismo naturalista. -/- Neurotheology appears as a new way to explain the relations between the human being and God, religions, and spirituality in general starting from Neurology (the study of the nervous system, especially the brain). But in certain cases it also pretends to demonstrate the existence or nonexistence of God. In this paper I would like to demonstrate how some forms of Neurotheology offer a symptomatic characteristic of our current culture, where Science acts as an all-embracing knowledge —it aspires to explain the entire aspect of reality— ignoring the limits of its method. Actually, some researchers transgress the principles of the scientific-experimental method and extrapolate to philosophical and theological issues. In this way, they overlap the epistemological limits of the different kinds of knowledge to become one only. Thus, science carries out, to say the least, a naturalist reductionism. (shrink)

Los sótanos del universo plantea la necesidad de cambiar la epistemología del conocimiento apodíctico científico-filosófico basado en la certidumbre por la “epistemología del riesgo”. Asimismo, sugiere un mayor acercamiento entre ciencia y filosofía para superar la actual confusión y estancamiento que afectan a estos saberes. Este artículo analiza ambos temas. -/- Los Sótanos del Universo proposes the necessity of changing the epistemology of apodictic scientific-philosophical knowledge, based on certainty, for the “epistemology of risk”. Furthermore, it suggests a better approach between (...) philosophy and science in order to surpass the confusion and standstill that affect these disciplines today. This paper analyses both matters. (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

La teoría de la intentio hoy conocida como “intencionalidad” había pasado desapercibida en la filosofía moderna y fue recuperada por Brentano, pero sobre todo fue puesta de relieve por Husserl, quien se apoyó en ella como uno de los elementos básicos de su fenomenología. Sin embargo, en esta corriente la intencionalidad perdió su sentido clásico. Así lo pone de manifiesto Jacques Maritain en su gnoseología. ¿Por qué Husserl cambia el sentido del concepto?, ¿cuál es la crítica principal de Maritain a (...) este hecho? Parece pertinente esclarecer ambas visiones a fin de comprender el sentido que ha prevalecido en la Filosofía de la Mente contemporánea y las Neurociencias. Lo que se halla en juego es nuevamente la antigua confrontación entre inmanentismo y realismo gnoseológico: admitir en qué consiste la intencionalidad es el punto de inflexión entre estas posiciones. En este trabajo pongo de manifiesto que la forma de asumir un legítimo realismo es mediante una metafísica del ser que reclama una intencionalidad radicada no solamente en el sujeto cognoscente sino además en su relación con la cosa conocida y no sólo con los meros objetos mentales. -/- El propósito de esta publicación es mostrar el punto de quiebre que se lleva a cabo en la teoría del conocimiento y en la psicología racional con respecto al concepto “intencionalidad” del realismo metafísico. La teoría de la intentio en F. Brentano recoge la idea original de los medievales pero sin ser muy explícito en los términos gnoseológicos ya que su objetivo primario consistió sobre todo en superar el psicologismo de su época. En cambio, esa teoría heredada por Husserl se ve alterada completamente con respecto a su sentido primigenio cuando aplica su método trascendental. Esto se puede apreciar en varias partes de su obra "Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica" (1913). (shrink)

It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify both (...) as having been done “at will,” in the relevant sense, and as a belief. Thus, no believer could believe at will. If my arguments are correct, our inability to believe at will reveals no genuine lack in our powers of mind, any more than an inability to draw a square circle reveals a lack of artistic skill. My account has been recently criticized by Kieran Setiya, who has provided an account of his own. Here I revisit and defend my account, hopefully in a way that will both make my thought clearer and illumine some of the broader differences between Setiya’s approach and my own. I then briefly consider Setiya’s own argument, in part to further develop the contrast. (shrink)

Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...) minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. (shrink)

We extend the languages of both basic and graded modal logic with the infinity diamond, a modality that expresses the existence of infinitely many successors having a certain property. In both cases we define a natural notion of bisimilarity for the resulting formalisms, that we dub $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$, respectively. We then characterise these logics as the bisimulation-invariant fragments of the naturally corresponding predicate logic, viz., the extension of first-order logic with the infinity quantifier. Furthermore, for (...) both $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$ we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of formulas that are valid in every Kripke frame, we prove a small model property with respect to a widened class of weighted models, and we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem. (shrink)

ISSN:1909-9711 (En línea) Misión La Revista Acta Colombiana de Psicología publica hallazgos originales de las investigaciones en Psicología y de esta disciplina en diálogo con otras, con el propósito de divulgarlas a la comunidad universitaria y a todas las personas interesadas en conocer sus nuevos avances y aplicaciones a distintos campos y necesidades de la sociedad contemporánea.

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

Nearly sixty years after its publication, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” continues to inspire important work. Its main legacy has been the notion of “reactive attitudes.” Surprisingly, Strawson’s central argument—an argument to the conclusion that no general thesis (such as the thesis of determinism) could provide us reason to abandon these attitudes—has received little attention. When the argument is considered, it is often interpreted as relying on a claim about our psychological capacities: we are simply not capable of abandoning (...) the reactive attitudes, across the board, in something like the way we are simply not capable of remembering everything we are told. A different line interprets Strawson as relying on something like a conceptual point: you can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice using notions that are, themselves, constituted by that practice. Neither interpretation would lead to you to expect what you will find, looking at the central text: Strawson twice accuses his opponent of being caught in some kind of contradiction. So neither interpretation, on its own, is correct. By providing a close reading of the central text, I do my best to articulate Strawson’s more interesting, and more powerful, argument. The argument depends on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is, I think, worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)